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Corruption has been the downfall of the Kenyan Government since independence.  
Corrupt public officials, ranking from the President to the simple civil servant, have stolen 
public property worth billions of shillings in form of land, money, buildings among others. In 
the early post-independence years, corruption scandals mostly plagued the Executive 
branches and Legislative branches. However, in the 1980s, corruption spread to the judiciary 
as the Executive and Legislative branches started exerting undue political influence over 
judges to gain favorable judgements. From then onwards, corruption became the only means 
through which the ordinary citizen would gain access to the justice system. 
This study was primarily based on a qualitative analysis of literature concerning 
judicial corruption in Kenya. The study investigated the history, nature, scale and main 
factors promoting corruption in the Kenyan judiciary. It examined the anti-corruption 
reforms before and after the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. Through 
various case studies of judicial corruption in other jurisdictions, the study reviewed several 
individual and institutional reforms that are suitable for mitigating judicial corruption in 
Kenya.  
 This study concluded that the current reforms aren’t sufficient in mitigating 
corruption in the judiciary. This study recommends that certain political, socio-economic, 
cultural and individual incentives be introduced within the legal and administrative 
framework of the judiciary. These incentives include punitive individual punishment, 
leniency, whistleblowing mechanisms, asymmetric punishment and public awareness and 
education. These measures will serve as means of deterrence and education to supplement the 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.0. Background  
“Why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge?”  
     -A popular saying in Kenya.1 
An independent and impartial judiciary is one of the key pillars of governance in an 
ideal democratic society. It protects basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
safeguards the rule of law and ensures societal order and integrity.  
However, in reality, judiciaries worldwide have become a den of greedy judges and 
judicial officers selling justice. For example, a documentary released in September 2015 by a 
Ghanaian journalist implicated 34 Ghanaian judges of accepting bribes in exchange for 
passing lower sentences.2Despite this observation, there is a scarcity of recent statistical and 
academic literature on corruption in judicial systems worldwide especially in developing 
countries. 
A basic definition of corruption is the use of public authority for personal gain.3 In the 
case of judicial corruption, it involves both the abuse of public office for personal gain and 
any inappropriate influence that results in an improper delivery of judicial services and legal 
protection for citizens.4This can be through bribery, political and societal pressures, fear of 
reprisal, pressure within the justice system and ineffective enforcement of judgements.5 
A common misconception is that judicial corruption involves judges and magistrates 
or other court officials only. However, it is widespread and systemic and pervades the entire 
justice system. It begins with the commencement of a criminal investigation or the filing of a 
                                                            
1 Gainer M, ‘Transforming the Courts: Judicial Sector Reforms in Kenya 2011-2015, Innovations for Successful 
Societies’, Princeton University, November 2015, 2 available at http://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu.   
2 Ghana's top undercover journalist masters disguise to expose corruption, as seen on 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/anas-aremeya-anas-ghana-corruption  accessed on 3 January 
2017 
3 OECD Glossaries, [2008], “Corruption”, A Glossary of International Standards in Criminal Law, OECD 
Publishing 
4 Noel MP, ‘Corruption and the Justice Sector’ (2003), 2. 




civil lawsuit throughout the judicial process, essentially culminating in the enforcement of 
the court’s decision.6 It affects both institutions and individuals including, among others: the 
police service, prosecutors, lawyers, the judiciary and the prison service.  
The judiciary in Kenya has been progressively viewed as subservient to the 
Executive, an upholder of state power and a poor protector of citizens’ rights.7 From 1963 to 
2002, the Executive arm and the political class maintained a frightening grip over the 
judiciary8.  For example, when news of the Goldenberg scandal broke out in 1993, the 
Attorney General used his nolle prosequi powers to discontinue two suits against suspected 
high ranking officials in a bid to protect them.9 Similarly, in 1998, Justice Akiwumi rejected 
an application by a KANU member who claimed that the party’s nomination process had 
denied him his constitutional rights on the grounds that the High Court lacked jurisdiction 
due to political pressure. However, the High Court has original and unlimited jurisdiction. 10  
The regime change in 2002, after the election of President Mwai Kibaki, was driven 
by the citizens’ wrath on corruption as a national pandemic and more so, in the judiciary.11 In 
the same year, the newly appointed Chief Justice appointed the Integrity and Anti-Corruption 
Committee of the judiciary to investigate corruption in the judiciary. The investigations 
showed that out of 3,234 officers as at 30th August 2003, consisting of 11  Judges of Appeal, 
44 Judges of the High Court, 254 Magistrates, 15 Kadhis and 2,910 paralegals, 152 judicial 
officers were implicated in corruption. 12 
These measures mitigated the historical malaise that afflicted the judiciary but failed 
to address the deep-rooted institutional and statutory shortcomings of the judiciary.  This was 
later solved by the promulgation of the COK 2010 which elevated the judiciary to be at par 
with the other arms of government, created the JSC to deal with all matters of the judiciary 
                                                            
6 Noel MP, ‘Corruption and  the Justice Sector’, 2. 
7 Ouma JO, ‘Judicial Independence in Kenya: Constitutional Challenges and Opportunities for reform’ 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Leicester, November 2011, i. 
8 Abdullahi A, ‘Restoring Public Confidence in Kenya’s discredited, corrupt, inefficient and over-burdened 
judiciary’ (2011). 
9 Mutua M, ‘Justice under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya’ Human Rights 
Quarterly, (2001), 117. 
10 James Kefa Wagara and Rumba Kinuthia v John Anguka and Ngaruro Gitahi, Civil Case No. 724 of 1988 as 
seen from Mutua M, ‘Justice under Siege’, 114. 
11  Ringera A, “Corruption in the judiciary” The World Bank, Washington DC,25th April 2007.  




and a Vetting Board to vet the suitability of judges and magistrates appointed to the 
judiciary.13 
Despite these measures, the East African Bribery Index Trends Analysis (2010 - 
2014) report by TI Kenya ranked the judiciary as one of the most corrupt institutions in 
Kenya. The JSC is currently embroiled in graft cases involving Kshs 310 million allegedly 
stolen by top judicial officers. 14Due to this, according to the study published by the Ipsos 
Synovate group in 2015, public confidence in the Supreme Court fell by 12 per cent from 
November of 2012, while confidence in the High Court and local and magistrate courts 
across the country fell by 7 per cent.15  
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
The right to an independent and impartial judiciary is vested in Article 159 and 160 of 
COK 2010. Article 159 provides that justice should be exercised in a fair and equal manner 
regardless of status16 while Article 160 protects independence of judges by ensuring that they 
have security of tenure, financial security and judicial immunity.17 
 The right to a competent, independent, and impartial judiciary is also articulated in 
Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 of the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Article 7 of the African Charter of Human Rights 
and the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the judiciary.18 
 In spite of the above, the Kenyan judiciary has for a long time been a puppet of the 
Executive as evidenced by the reports of the Kwach Committee, Ringera Committee and the 
Panel of the Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts (See Section 2.3 of this paper). This 
                                                            
13 Abdullahi A, ‘Restoring Public Confidence’, (2011). 
14 Kenya: Judiciary officials charged over purchase of Chief Justice Willy Mutunga's house 
as seen on  https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000171810/kenya-judiciary-officials-charged-over-
purchase-of-chief-justice-willy-mutunga-s-house accessed on 3 January 2017. 
15 Osaleh L, “Tackling Corruption in Kenyan judiciary,” International Governance Institute -Annual General 
Meeting, Nairobi, 2015.  
16 Article 159, COK (2010). 
17 Article 160, COK (2010). 




systemic corruption of the Kenyan justice system denies every innocent Kenyan the 
fundamental human right to be governed by the rule of law.19  
Former Chief Justice Willy Mutunga stated that “You are taking these people into a 
corrupt investigating system, through a corrupt anti-corruption system, and a corrupt 
judiciary”. 20This does not reflect the judicial reforms that the COK 2010 have brought about 
such as the Judiciary Transformation Framework(See Section 3.2 of this paper), vetting of 
judges and the case management system to try and curb corruption. 
The above reasons have therefore led to this study which analyses corruption within 
the judiciary to identify loopholes within the existing legal and administrative framework of 
the judiciary and propose possible solutions. 
1.3. Statement of Objectives 
1. To identify the causes of judicial corruption over the years. 
2. To analyse the judicial reforms recommended and their implementation. 
3. To identify loopholes in the anti-corruption reforms recommended and implemented. 
4. To make recommendations on how to improve the legal and administrative anti-corruption 
framework.  
1.4. Research questions 
1. What are the obstacles hindering the efficiency of the current anti-corruption framework? 
2. What is the feasibility and practicality of creation of an anti-corruption framework that can 
mitigate corruption despite the historical malaise and political influence entrenched in the 
judiciary? 
1.5. Justification and Scope of study 
A significant knowledge gap exists in the area of judicial corruption. In 2015, the 
International Bar Association highlighted that there is a significant gap in knowledge 
regarding the nature, scope and drivers of corrupt practices in the Judiciary and in order to 
                                                            
19 Anukansai K, ‘Corruption: The Catalyst for Violation of Human Rights’ National Anti-Corruption Journal, 
8. 
20 Lindijer K, Kenya has become a “bandit economy”, as seen on 
<http://africanarguments.org/2016/01/11/kenya-has-become-a-bandit-economy-says-chief-justice-willy-




address this gap, it is necessary to understand the specific manners in which corruption 
occurs in different judicial systems around the world.21 
The East African Bribery Index Trends Analysis report by TI Kenya states that the 
Kenyan judiciary is prone to corrupt practices at both grand and petty levels.22 It registered 
the highest average size of bribes paid among similar institutions with an average size of a 
bribe as Kshs 7,885.23 In 2015, the JSC was embroiled in graft cases worth Kshs 310 million.  
Lastly, on 3rd August 2015, Kenya’s Chief Justice Willy Mutunga sounded the alarm that 
corruption was creeping back into the judiciary as well – the first time the highly respected 
official has made such a claim publicly.24  
This study will analyse corruption within the judiciary specifically involving court 
officials such as judges, magistrates and court clerks among others. Furthermore, the study 
will focus on the historical and cultural background of corruption in Kenya and analyze the 
feasibility of existing and recommended anti-corruption reforms against this background. 
This study will benefit academic scholars, researchers as well as the common 
‘mwananchi’ on the way to tackle corruption in the judiciary. It will provide insight from a 
legal perspective on how to tackle corruption. 
1.6. Hypothesis  
Judicial corruption in Kenya can be mitigated through a myriad of political, social, economic, 
individual and cultural incentives. 
1.7. Theoretical Framework 
Studies have shown that corruption in many countries is a deeply ingrained cultural 
issue. Authors Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel evaluated the role of social norms in 
corruption by studying parking violations of international diplomats living in New York 
City.25 Prior to 2002, all consular personnel and their families had diplomatic immunity 
                                                            
21 Judicial Integrity Initiative Launch: Judicial Systems and Corruption 9 December 2015: London, UK 
22 Transparency International, The East African Bribery Index Trends Analysis(EABITA), 2015. 
23 Transparency International, EABITA, 2015. 
24Githongo  J, Kenya's rampant corruption is eating away at the very fabric of democracy as seen on 
<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/aug/06/kenya-barack-obama-visit-anti-corruption-
plan-democracy> accessed on 20 November 2016. 
25 Fisman R, Miguel E, ‘Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking 




which shielded them from paying parking fines.26 The illegal parking fit into the standard 
definition of corruption of ‘abuse of public office for private gain’ which served as a measure 
of corruption culture in different societies.27 Prior to 2002, international diplomats had no 
incentives to pay their parking fines. Therefore, they were free to do what they wanted. The 
study showed that the culture of corruption was illustrated through the various diplomats as 
those who had the most tickets were from countries with a high level of corruption. In 2002, 
authorities enforced the right to confiscate the diplomatic license plates of violators which 
led to a sharp drop in unpaid parking violations illustrating the correlation between cultural 
norms and legal enforcement to corruption.28 
In Kenya, corruption is deemed to be a social and cultural issue which occurs in all 
walks of life and is inculcated into children in their early stages of life. Kenyans pay bribes to 
access public services such as obtaining an identification card which is supposed to be a free 
public service. A proper analysis of mitigation of corruption requires a holistic approach of 
analysing economic, social, political and cultural considerations. 
The political analysis involves the role of the state in judicial corruption. Several 
theories exist on this the role of the state in corruption particularly in Africa. The main 
political theory that this study will use is the political theory of separation of powers. 
Separation of powers entails the independence of the three arms of the government 
(Legislature, Executive and judiciary).29 The independence ensures that each arm can carry 
out a proper checks and balances of the other arms of the government.30 However, without 
the independence of each arm, for example, political influence is entrenched in the judiciary 
and the rule of law, the judiciary is supposed to protect, is undermined. 
The social perspective analyses the characteristics of society that perpetuates judicial 
corruption namely human attitudes, values and actions. A good sociological theory is the 
structural functionalist theory, as championed by Emile Durkheim.  This theory views society 
                                                            
26 Fisman R, Miguel E, Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement, 1020. 
27 Fisman R, Miguel E, Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement, 1021. 
28 Fisman R, Miguel E, Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement, 1022. 
29 Waldron J, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, Boston College Law Review, Vol 54:433, 433. 




as a system of different parts which work and depend on each other.31 The society influences 
each other in both positive and negative ways for example though corruption. The 
relationships between different parts of society are maintained through shared societal values 
and attitudes.32 
The economic perspective examines economic factors such as income inequality, 
rent-seeking and incentives which perpetuate or reduce corruption. The most important 
economic theory in the context of corruption is the rational choice theory as championed by 
William Stanley Jevons. The rational choice theory states that social behavior is determined 
by the behaviour of individual actors.33 Each individual actor is assumed to be a rational 
agent who takes into account available information, probabilities of events, and potential 
costs and benefits in determining preferences before choosing the best choice of an action.34 
In this context, the different probabilities consist of whether or not to engage in corruption 
which depends on the outcome of the cost benefit analysis.  
Lastly, organisational cultural theories talk about the causal path from a certain 
culture – a certain group culture – leads to a mental state, which leads to corrupt behaviour.35  
 In conclusion, this study will focus on how to examine which factors have not been 
included in the mitigation of corruption within the administrative and legal framework of the 
judiciary. 
1.8. Literature review  
This study seeks to systematically identify political, economic, social and cultural 
norms that promote corruption and regulate them within the legal and administrative 
                                                            
31 Individual meaning cannot be understood independently of a wider system of collective practices and beliefs 
within which it is embedded. These collective practices, in turn, are to be explained by the functions they serve 
for the system of social life as a whole. See Holmwood J, Historical Developments and Theoretical Approaches 
in Sociology, Encylopedia of Life Support Systems, Vol II, 2.  
32 This is what is referred to by Durkheim as mechanical solidarity. See Durkheim, E. (1997). The Division of 
Labor in Society. New York, NY: Free Press. 
33 Egharevba S, Police Brutality, racial profiling and discrimination in the criminal justice system, IGI Global, 
(2017), 92. 
34 Egharevba S, Police Brutality, racial profiling and discrimination in the criminal justice system, IGI Global, 
(2017), 92. 
35 Gjalt GD, ‘Causes of corruption: Towards a contextual theory of corruption’ Public Administration Quarterly 




framework of the judiciary. It is important to note though that there is very little literature 
discussing judicial corruption. 
First, this study will analyze the history of corruption in the Kenyan judiciary and the 
reports on judicial corruption prior to COK 2010 and identify the social and cultural norms 
that were reported to promote corruption. For example, the 1998 Report of the Committee on 
the Administration of Justice, the 2002 Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent 
Commonwealth Judicial Experts, the 2004 Draft COK and the 2003 Ringera Report and a 
2005 report by the International Commission of Jurists discussing the judicial independence, 
corruption and reform of the Kenyan judiciary. 
The second step will be to analyze the legal and administrative framework of the 
judiciary since the promulgation of COK 2010. This will include a critical analysis of the 
COK 2010, Vision 2030, Report of the Task Force on Judicial reforms 2010 (See Section 
2.3) and the Judiciary Transformation Framework of 2012-2016 (See Section 3.2). 
Lastly, this study will undertake a comparative study of judicial corruption and 
reforms all over the world, focusing on developing or developed countries which have had or 
have a socio-economic and cultural problem of corruption. A cultural analysis is essential 
because as stated in a Transparency International report:  
“In many countries social interactions are governed less by law than customary or 
familial codes of conduct. To regard as corrupt judges who support the interests of 
their relatives, overlooks the notion that it may be more dishonorable for a judge to 
ignore the wishes of a family member than to abide strictly by the law. Nor is the 
rule of law as important in such countries as individual relationships. The strength 
of personal relationships is so great in some countries that all judicial decisions are 
suspected of being a product of influence. In some countries, paying a bribe is 
considered an essential prerequisite for judicial services and, indeed, the only 
avenue for accomplishing results for example in Kenya, the saying ‘Why hire a 
lawyer, if you can buy a judge?’ is common”.36 
                                                            
36Noel MP, ‘Corruption within the judiciary: causes and remedies’ Global Corruption Report, Transparency 




In conclusion, corruption can be mitigated if political, economic, cultural and social 
norms promoting corruption are identified and regulated within the legal and administrative 
framework of the judiciary. 
1.9. Research Design & Methodology 
Research on this dissertation will take the form of qualitative research through 
literature review. The study will use primary resources such as the COK 2010, The Kenya 
Gazette and various statues and policies which provide an in-depth understanding of the legal 
framework of the judiciary as well as secondary resources such as journals, books, articles 
and the internet which highlight various opinions of various authors as well as comparative 
assessment of other judiciaries worldwide. 
No quantitative research will be carried out due to lack of time and unwillingness of 
court officials to discuss the sensitive issue of corruption.   
1.10. Limitations 
This research is limited by lack of recent literature on the issue of judicial corruption. 
This research is also limited by the time restrictions of the Law School to complete the study. 
Lastly, the research is limited by lack of quantitative analysis whereby questionnaires and 
interviews would have been used to collect data on the perceptions and reality of the 
prevalence of corruption in the judiciary. It is difficult to know the level of actual corruption 
versus perceived corruption in the judiciary as it is deemed as a sensitive matter to discuss. 
1.11. Chapter Breakdown 
a) Chapter one: This chapter will serve as the introduction to the proposal. It will provide a 
detailed background of the study, the statement, the purpose of the study and the hypothesis. 
It will also highlight the justification of the study, the limitations, definition of terms and 
provide a chapter summary. 
b) Chapter Two: This chapter will give an in-depth look into the history of corruption in the 
judiciary in Kenya and the evolution of the anti-corruption framework prior to the 





c) Chapter Three: This chapter will analyse judicial reforms related to the mitigation of 
corruption after the promulgation of the COK 2010. It will also highlight the loopholes 
within the current anti-corruption framework. 
d) Chapter Four: This chapter will conduct a comparative assessment of other jurisdictions 
facing judicial corruption and the reforms they have successfully implemented. The countries 
discussed are Singapore, Hong Kong and China. 
d) Chapter Five: This chapter will briefly discuss the findings from all chapters and 
recommend measures to mitigate judicial corruption based on those findings and provide a 
conclusion. 
1.12. Timeline/Duration 
The project was carried out and completed within a period of six months. 
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF JUDICIAL CORRUPTION AND 
REFORMS BEFORE THE COK 2010 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter will provide a detailed history of judicial corruption over the years and the 
reforms that were recommended and/or implemented to curb corruption before the 
promulgation of the COK 2010. 
2.2. History of Judicial Corruption until 2010 
 “We found an institution so frail in its structures; so thin on resources; so low on its 
confidence; so deficient in integrity; so weak in its public support that to have expected it to 
deliver justice was to be wildly optimistic. We found a judiciary that was designed to fail37.” 
 The history of corruption in the judiciary can be traced to the colonial era. The 
judiciary was built on a foundation of inequality and on a racial basis.38 Initially, when 
Kenya was declared a British Protectorate in 1890, the only courts which existed were those 
                                                            
37 Dr Willy Mutunga, “Speech on the Progress Report on the Transformation of the judiciary: The First 
Hundred And Twenty Days”, Nairobi, 19th October 2011. 
38 Kiwinda MM, Osogo JA, The New Constitutional Law of Kenya: Principles, Government and Human Rights, 




which served foreigners. The indigenous people, Indians, Muslims and Arabs were left to 
practice their own communal and religious law.39 
The indigenous people had no legal right to sue as there were no courts which served 
them. They were only served by the Native tribunals run by village elders.. If they had a 
dispute with a foreigner, they could not sue them using indigenous judicial systems as they 
were denied recognition on the pretext that they were repugnant to justice and morality.40This 
system segregated the indigenous people and subordinated indigenous laws.  
After Kenya’s independence in 1963, the dual system was abolished and a common 
law system was adopted which further subjugated the indigenous people. Furthermore, the 
judiciary was still dominated by foreigners.41 However, the foreign judges were on contract 
and were susceptible to manipulation42 as the renewal of their contract depended on the 
government.43  
 However, the most significant reason why judicial corruption went on the rise was 
the amount of power the Executive wielded over the judiciary. From 1981 to 2002, Kenya 
became a one-party state with no separation of powers. The judiciary was treated as a 
government department and not as a separate arm of the government.44 
Furthermore, the provisions of the 1963 COK further undermined the independence 
and impartiality of the judiciary. Subsequent constitutional amendments left the judiciary 
under the complete control of the Executive. The first amendment was the COK 
(Amendment) (No 2) Act No 38 of 1964 which transferred all appointing authority of judges 
to the Office of the President.45The second amendment was the COK (Amendment) Act No. 
14 of 1986 which removed the security of tenure of the offices Attorney General, Controller, 
                                                            
39 Republic of Kenya, Judiciary Transformation Framework 2012-2016, 8. 
40 Republic of Kenya, Judiciary Transformation Framework 2012-2016, 8. 
41Republic of Kenya,  Judiciary Transformation  Framework 2012-2016, 8. 
42 Adar GK, Munyae MI, ‘Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2001’ African Studies 
Quaterly, 5(2001), 4. 
43 Adar GK, Munyae MI, ‘Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2001’, 4. 
44 Adar GK, Munyae MI, ‘Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel Arap Moi 1978-2001’, 4. 
45 Washington M, Kenyan constitutional amendments through time as seen on 





and Auditor General, thus eroding the independence of the two offices.46Furthermore, there 
was another amendment of the COK Act No. 4 of 1988 which removed security of tenure for 
the office of the Public Service Commission, High Court judges and Court of Appeal 
judges.47However due to pressure from foreign donors, The COK (Amendment) Act No. 2 
of 1990 restored security of tenure of the office of the Public Service Commission, High 
Court judges and Court of Appeal judges.48 
   In addition to these laws, there were no provisions for a judiciary fund which 
would allow the judiciary to control how much they received from the National Assembly. 
The judiciary was dependent on the Executive and other agencies which provided funds.49 
Moreover, in the late 1990s, the Executive continued interfering with court cases, 
especially those that were political as reiterated by Judges Bena Lata and William Mbuya in 
April 1995.50The ‘Koigi Four’ case is a prime example of this. In this case, Koigi wa 
Wamwere, a leading opponent of Moi, and three others, Geoffrey Njuguna Ngengi, Charles 
Koigi wa Wamwere and James Maigua Ndumo were arrested April 1994 on charges of 
raiding a police station in Bahati, in Moi’s home province of the Rift Valley.51 They were 
sentenced to 24 years for a simple robbery which was an extremely punitive punishment. 
Upon investigation, it was discovered that the presiding judge, Justice Tuiyot, was promoted 
to the highest magistrate post during the proceedings and that the police officers who found 
the incriminating evidence were given state awards.52 
                                                            
46 Washington M, Kenyan constitutional amendments through time as seen on 
https://wildaboutafrica.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/kenyan-constitution-amendments-thru-time accessed on 10 
December 2016. 
47 Washington M, Kenyan constitutional amendments through time as seen on 
https://wildaboutafrica.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/kenyan-constitution-amendments-thru-time accessed on 10 
December 2016.  
48Washington M, Kenyan constitutional amendments through time as seen on 
https://wildaboutafrica.wordpress.com/2010/07/13/kenyan-constitution-amendments-thru-time accessed on 10 
December 2016. 
49Separation of powers and independence of the judiciary in the Kenyan context, as seen on 
http://www.ckadvocates.co.ke/2014/11/separation-of-powers-and-independence-of-the-judiciary-in-the-kenyan-
context accessed on 10 December 2016. 
50 Carver R, WRITENET, ‘Kenya: Update to End July 1995’, 1 August 1995 available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a6b78.html accessed on 10 December 2016. 
51 Charles Koigi Wamwere & 2 others v Republic [1992]Eklr 
52 Wachira C, Kenya-human rights: Government back under fire over dissidents, as seen on 
http://www.ipsnews.net/1996/01/kenya-human-rights-government-back-under-fire-over-dissidents accessed on 




 In 1998, a survey conducted by SODNET indicated that 40% of Kenyans had 
problems accessing justice with 48% stating that it was mainly because of corruption.53Sixty-
eight point one percent (68.1%) of the respondents were asked to bribe a judicial officer and 
66.8% agreed to bribe but only 57.6% of those who were bribed actually performed the 
needed service.54In 2000, a survey by DFID-EA stated that 81% of 336 respondents stated 
that the judiciary was corrupt.55In February 2002, TI published a report stating that the 
Kenyan judiciary ranked as the sixth most corrupt institution in Kenya in its bribery index 
and the police, crucial to the justice system, ranked as the most corrupt institution.56 
 In 2002, the regime change led by President Kibaki promised to eradicate corruption 
within the judiciary in what was deemed as the “radical surgery”.57 However, the process 
which will be highlighted below was procedurally unfair, highly politicised and left the 
judiciary grossly understaffed with a big backlog of cases and in the hands of the 
Executive.58 
By 2007, Kenyans had lost total confidence in the judiciary. Therefore, when 
President Mwai Kibaki appointed new judges and IEBC commissioners just days away from 
the election and the election results were seen to have been tampered with, it instigated anger 
and suspicion that led to the post-election violence which killed many and left even more 
internally displaced.59 
                                                            
53 E Oyugi, ‘Corruption: A Survey of the Extent and Attitudes Towards Corruption in Service Delivery in 
Kenya Covering the Areas of Education, Health, Land, Judicial Services and the Police Force’,55. See also 
Letizia WM, ‘Corruption in the Kenyan judiciary, Will the vetting of judges and magistrates solve this problem’ 
Unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Nairobi, November 2013, 33. 
54 E Oyugi, ‘Corruption’,55. See also Letizia WM, ‘Corruption in the Kenyan judiciary’, November 2013, 33. 
55 ICJ Kenya, ‘Strengthening Judicial Reforms in Kenya-Performance indicators: Public Perceptions of the 
Court Divisions, Children’s Court and the Anti - Corruption Court’ 35. 
56 Transparency International, ‘The Kenyan Urban Bribery Index Report’ (2001). 
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 After an international mediation process was carried out by Kofi Annan, Kenya 
formed a coalition government and an independent commission was appointed to draft a new 
constitution that would address among other things: the weakness of the judiciary.60 
2.3. Reforms before the COK 2010 
From 1992 to the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010, there were efforts to reform 
the judiciary by several committees which identified the problems in the judiciary among 
them corruption and recommended solutions.61However, most of the recommendations were 
not implemented as we will see below.  
The first efforts towards fighting corruption began in 1956 when the Prevention of 
Corruption Ordinance was enacted.62 In 1992, it was amended to create the Anti-Corruption 
Squad within the police but the squad was disbanded in 1995.63 In 1997, the act was amended 
to create the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority with investigative and prosecutorial powers. 
However, it was declared unconstitutional in 2000 and then dissolved.64 
In 1998, the Legislature constituted the Kwach Committee to investigate the 
corruption in Kenya. The committee produced a report which among other recommendations, 
proposed the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill (2000) to replace the Prevention of 
Corruption Act.65 
 The enactment of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003, the Public 
Officers Ethics Act 2003, and the establishment of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission 
in May 2003 further highlighted the government’s efforts to fight corruption.66 Moreover, in 
September 2003, a judicial integrity committee was created to carry out what was known as 
the “radical surgery” of the judiciary. Lastly, in 2004, a National Anti-Corruption Steering 
                                                            
60 Gainer M, How Kenya cleaned up its courts,  as seen on http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/09/how-kenya-
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Committee was launched to create a nation-wide campaign to create awareness on how to 
prevent and fight corruption.67 
 This study will discuss the reports of various committees that mainly focused on 
corruption in the judiciary:  
2.3.1. Kwach Judicial Reform Committee 
 In 1998, the late Chief Justice Chesoni, appointed a six man committee headed by 
Justice Richard Kwach to assess the image and performance of the judiciary. In their report, 
the committee stated that corruption was rampant within the judiciary and existed in two 
forms: petty or grand corruption. ‘Petty’ corruption was primarily among the junior staff and 
was caused by poor remuneration and poor terms of service while grand corruption involved 
high ranking judicial officers.68 
The report highlighted the various ways corruption can take place and the factors causing 
corruption within the judiciary69 as well as providing recommendations of judicial reforms.70 
                                                            
67 Ogendi P, Anti corruption review, as seen on https://ogendi.wordpress.com   accessed on  2 January 2017. 
68 ICJ Kenya, ‘Strengthening Judicial Reforms In Kenya-Performance indicators’, 4 (2007),34. 
69 The report highlighted the various ways corruption can take place such as intentional misplacement of files; 
delay of trials, judgements and rulings; fraud; bribery; using public funds for private gain; intentional loss of 
court records; intentional alteration of court records; overstaying in one station by judicial officers; inadequate 
remuneration; poor terms of service and lack of proper vetting especially in the appointment of 
judges.69Furthermore, the report highlighted the factors causing corruption within the judiciary as interaction 
with litigants or their relatives; visitors in chambers; business deals; undue familiarity with the Bar and the local 
populace; lack of transparency in discharge of judicial function and lack of a transparent and merit based 
judicial appointment system. See ICJ Kenya, ‘Strengthening Judicial Reforms In Kenya-Performance 
indicators: Public Perceptions of the Court Divisions, Children’s Court and the Anti - Corruption Court’ 4 
(2007),34. 
70 The recommendations of the Kwach Report included creation of a code of conduct for all judicial officers; 
creation and adoption of a transfer policy to reduce familiarity of judicial staff; all matters should be heard in 
open court to prevent litigants from accessing the Magistrate’s chambers; vetting of all judicial appointments70; 
a declaration of wealth by all judicial officers; increased remuneration for all judicial officers; improved 
regulations and processes of appointment; promotion and performance appraisal of judicial officers and court 
staff; reorganisation of the courts including the High Court to create the Commercial Court, Family Court, 
Criminal Court and Civil Court and creation of more magistrates’ courts in areas outside Nairobi and 
enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction. See ICJ Kenya, ‘Strengthening Judicial Reforms In Kenya-Performance 







Only two of the reforms were implemented. First, the reorganisation of the courts, creation of 
more magistrates’ courts and enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction was successful. It 
reduced the backlog of cases and the need to travel to Nairobi to attend court.71Secondly, 
there was creation of better terms of service resulted in better job satisfaction.72However, 
there was a clear lack of enforcement and implementation of the reforms of the committee. 
Significant failures included lack of implementation of a 1999 code of conduct drafted by the 
Implementation Committee, lack of an amendment for public hearing of all cases except 
special matters;73 the vetting procedures were not created or legislated and there was no 
implementation of the proposed declaration of assets. 
 
2.3.2. Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts 
In 2002, the Commission of Kenya Review Commission established the Advisory 
Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts in conjunction with the ICJ to advise it on 
reforms within the Kenyan judiciary. Section 17(v) of the CKRC Act gives the CKRC the 
specific mandate "to examine and make recommendations on the judiciary generally and in 
particular, the establishment and jurisdiction of the courts, aiming at measures necessary to 
ensure the competence, accountability, efficiency, discipline and independence of the 
judiciary”.74 
The Panel stated that there were legitimate and widespread allegations of corruption 
in courts which mainly took the form of bribery and exertion of political influence. The 
public had lost confidence in the judiciary. It gave recommendations based on two principles: 
Judicial independence and accountability. On the matter of judicial independence, the panel 
cited Article 1 of the U.N. Basic Principles of the Independence of the judiciary (1985) 
which requires states to guarantee judicial independence in their Constitution or their 
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73 Ogendi P, Anti corruption review, as seen on https://ogendi.wordpress.com   accessed on  2 January 2017. 
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laws.75Furthermore, Article 2 provides that the judiciary shall decide matters before them in 
an impartial manner, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any 
restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or 
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.76 
On the second issue of accountability, judicial officers must be accountable for their 
actions. Accountability goes hand in hand with judicial independence and can be achieved 
through various reforms. They recommended various reforms which included but not limited 
to vesting of judicial authority, appeals, appointment of judges, the conduct and removal of 
judges and the restructuring of Judicial Service Commission.77 
2.3.2.1. Implementation  
The report’s recommendations78 were not implemented by the judiciary but formed the major 
basis for the provisions regarding the judiciary in the 2004 Draft Constitution.79 
                                                            
75 Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts as seen on 
http://www.commonlii.org/ke/other/KECKRC/2002/8.html  accessed on 2 January 2017. 
76 Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts as seen on 
http://www.commonlii.org/ke/other/KECKRC/2002/8.html  accessed on 2 January 2017. 
77 Report of the Advisory Panel of Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts as seen on 
http://www.commonlii.org/ke/other/KECKRC/2002/8.html  accessed on 2 January 2017. 
78 Several recommendations were made by the panel of commonwealth judges. First, it was recommended that 
judicial authority should be vested in the judiciary alongside the Executive and Legislature to ensure 
recognition of and respect for the distinctive role of the courts in the governance of the Republic of Kenya. The 
1963 COK did not vest any judicial authority in the judiciary yet it vested Executive power in the President in 
Article 23(1) and vested Legislative power in Legislature in Article 30 of the 1963 COK. This created a 
perception of a weak judiciary which was subordinate to the other two arms of the government. Another 
recommendation was for the Chief Justice shall have general supervisory powers over the judiciary and have 
direct administrative responsibility for the Supreme Court. Additionally, it was recommended that there should 
be a President of the Court of Appeal and President of the High Court to preside over and have direct 
responsibility for the administration of those courts. Another important recommendation was that a Supreme 
Court of Kenya should be established in addition to the existing courts and it shall be the final court of appeal in 
all matters. It was also recommended that a comprehensive code of conduct for all judicial officers should be 
adopted which required them to disclose financial assets upon appointment and every year thereafter as well as 
to report to the Judicial Service Commission any forms of corruption. Lastly, the Panel recommended that there 
should be and establishment of an office of the Director of Public Prosecutions who shall have the powers of the 
Attorney General and the establishment of a Committee to receive and assess the merits of any complaints 
against a judge before referral to a tribunal appointed by the President. See Report of the Advisory Panel of 
Eminent Commonwealth Judicial Experts as seen on 
http://www.commonlii.org/ke/other/KECKRC/2002/8.html  accessed on 2 January 2017. 





2.3.3. Report of the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee of the judiciary (Ringera 
Committee) 
In 2003, the Chief Justice revived the Committee on Reform and Development of the 
judiciary and established a sub-committee in March headed by Justice Aaron Ringera called 
the Integrity and Anti-Corruption Committee.80This sub-committee was to investigate and 
report on the level of corruption within the judiciary, its nature and causes and to identify 
corrupt judicial officials.81 
The committee’s findings were that firstly, there was an existence of perceived and actual 
corruption, the latter taking the form of petty or grand corruption. The committee also noted 
that corruption may be through different means: Land, fish, goats and other livestock; 
‘harambee’ contributions; personal entertainment and hospitality and sexual favors. Cash was 
the most prevalent form and sexual favors were the least prevalent.82 
The committee’s investigations showed that out of 3234 officers, comprising 11 Judges of 
Appeal, 44 Judges of the High Court, 254 Magistrates, 15 Kadhis and 2910 paralegals, 152 
judicial officers were implicated in corruption of which: 6 judges were from the Court of 
Appeal, 18 judges were from the High Court, 82 magistrates and 43 were paralegal officers.83 
2.3.3.1. Implementation 
Several of the recommendations84 were implemented. First, a new Registrar and Chief Justice 
were appointed85 and 42 judicial officers were dismissed.86The rules governing the conduct 
and dispensation of constitutional applications were also promulgated.87 
                                                            
80Republic of Kenya, Report of the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Governance in the judiciary, November 2005, 
63. 
81 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Sub-Committee, November 2005, 63. 
82 Ringera A, “Corruption in the judiciary” The World Bank, Washington DC,25th April 2007. 
83 Ringera A, “Corruption in the judiciary” The World Bank, Washington DC,25th April 2007. 
84 The committee recommended several reforms. First, they recommended the establishment of a Supreme 
Court with appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Appeal.84They also recommended a fast track procedure for 
dispensing with Constitutional references on constitutional Interpretation and protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms.84 Another recommendation was that magistrates’ courts should be manned by a Senior Resident 
Magistrate with jurisdiction to deal with all criminal cases in remote and geographically expansive areas of 
Northern Kenya and the Coast Province. Additionally, they recommended that all judicial units should have 
financial and operational autonomy that is not linked with the district treasuries and should be in charge of their 




Additionally, provisions for judicial independence, appointment of judges as well as removal 
from office and the powers of the JSC were included in the draft Constitution.88Lastly, the 
Kenya Bribery Index 2004 survey (Transparency International) indicated a very significant 
decrease in petty corruption as compared to 200289 as there was a significant reduction of 
cost of bribery to citizens and the judiciary ranked as the most improved organisations in 
2002. 90  
2.3.4. Subcommittee on Ethics and Governance 
In 2005, a Sub-committee was established by the Chief Justice to investigate judicial 
integrity as part of a biennial review and a follow-up to the Ringera Committee.91 The 
committee noted that there was a marked improvement in judicial integrity since 2003.  
However, the Committee received specific complaints against some judges, magistrates, 
Kadhis and paralegal staff.92 The committee prepared a report on its findings93 together with 
its recommendations in respect to each officer but did not disseminate to the public.94 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
improved remuneration and better terms of service for the lower judiciary; formulation and implementation of a 
transparent transfer policy; a system of wealth declarations by judicial staff effected for all public officers 
through the Public Officer Ethics Act 2003 and better personnel recruitment, deployment and disciplinary 
systems and practices. See Ringera A, “Corruption in the judiciary” The World Bank, Washington DC,25th 
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91 Republic of Kenya , Report of the Sub-Committee, November 2005, 3. 
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93 The principal causes of corruption were said to be poor terms and conditions of service; bad deployment and 
transfer policies and practices; delays in hearing and determination of cases; human greed; non-meritocratic 
recruitment and promotion practices; ignorance of the public on their legal rights; entitlements; procedures and 
processes of the court; existence of wide discretion of judicial officers in civil and criminal matters; an 
entrenched culture; excessive judicial workload due to insufficient personnel; ineffective action against 
identified corrupt judicial officers; inadequate supervision of judicial officers; protection of corrupt officers; 
misplacement of court files; interference by the Executive; retention of judicial officers after the retirement age; 
conflict of interest; phobia of the legal process and poor conditions in prisons and remand homes. See Republic 
of Kenya, Report of the Sub-Committee on Ethics and Governance in the judiciary, November 2005, 63. 





None of the recommendations95 were implemented until the promulgation of the COK 2010. 
2.3.5. The Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial Reforms 
In 2009, the Task force on Judicial Reforms was appointed to, among other objectives, 
consider and advise on ways of dealing with corruption or perceived corruption in the 
judiciary. It identified four forms of corruption in the judiciary: bribery, fraud, abuse of 
judicial office and receiving favors.96 It also noted that judicial corruption was related to 
corruption within the bar, collusion of advocates with judicial officers; and undue familiarity 
between judicial officers and staff.97 
 
2.3.5.1. Implementation 
The recommendations98 were included and implemented within the Judiciary Transformation 
Framework which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
                                                            
95 It stressed several recommendations in an effort to curb corruption such as amendment of the Constitution to 
vest judicial power in the judiciary; enhancement of the security of tenure for magistrates and Kadhis as judicial 
officers; amendment of the Constitution to provide that expenses of judiciary will be a direct charge on the 
Consolidated Fund; establishment of the Disciplinary Committee of the Judicial Service Commission for 
various cadres of judicial staff; establishment of a Judicial Complaints and Disciplinary Committee (JCDC) to 
investigate complaints against judges before the disciplinary cases are referred to the constitutional tribunals 
and the establishment of a Litigant’s Charter to provide basic information on the process of the court in order to 
enhance accessibility and effectiveness of the court services. See Republic of Kenya, Report of the Sub-
Committee on Ethics and Governance in the judiciary, November 2005, 4-5. 
96 Republic of Kenya, Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial Reforms, July 2010, 74-76. 
97 Republic of Kenya, Final Report of the Task Force, July 2010, 77. 
98 The recommendations of the committee included the development of a corruption prevention policy within 
the judiciary to guide anti-corruption initiatives in the institution; a mapping exercise to identify and take 
remedial measures on the main areas prone to corruption; the development of mechanisms for regular 
monitoring of the exercise of discretion by judicial officers; the rotation of duty judges after one term; public 
awareness on the content of the Judicial Service Codes of Conduct and Ethics; regular inspection of judicial 
systems through the Inspectorate unit to assess and mitigate systems or procedures that encourage corruption; 
provision of accessible facilities for direct banking of court fees, charges and fines by the public, litigants or 
advocates to avoid fraud; development of a manual to guide judicial officers on the award of damages in civil 
cases and other matters; recommendations of previous integrity committees on procurement and financial 
management in the judiciary to be implemented without further delay; removal of judicial officers found liable 
for corruption from the judicial service by the JSC; development of a case management and statistical system 
that tracks the productivity of all judicial officers against performance standards to minimise opportunities for 
delay of cases and corruption and identification of all judicial officers and staff with badges, name tags and 
court uniforms within the court precincts. See Republic of Kenya, Final Report of the Task Force on Judicial 





Prior to the promulgation of the COK 2010, there was a clear lack of enforcement and 
implementation of the recommendations of the various reports made by committees over the 
years. Although there were no major changes in the judiciary, these reports proved to be the 
foundation of the reforms included in the draft COK 2010 and the judiciary Transformation 
Framework.   
 
 
CHAPTER THREE: REFORMS UNDER THE NEW 2010 
CONSTITUITION OF KENYA AND THE JUDICIARY 
TRANSFORMATION FRAMEWORK 
In the peace accord that brought an end to the 2007-2008 post-election conflict, 
President Kibaki’s party and the opposition led by Raila Odinga agreed to share power in a 
grand coalition government for a period of five years.99The parties also committed 
themselves to a programme on a long-term programme of institutional reforms which 
involved Kenya’s constitution-making process, and pursuing reform of the judiciary. In the 
event, the two strands became intertwined through the promulgation of the COK 2010 and 
the establishment of the judiciary Transformation Framework.100 
3.1. The 2010 Constitution of Kenya 
In the 2010 TI Global Corruption Barometer, 43% of Kenyans who sought services 
from the judiciary reported paying bribes.101  
The promulgation of the COK 2010 heralded a new era for judicial reforms in Kenya. 
The new constitution was passed through a national referendum in August 2010 with 68% of 
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the vote.102The new constitution introduced new provisions which protected judicial 
authority and security of tenure. Article 159 of the COK of 2010 states that judicial authority 
is derived from the people and is vested and exercised by the courts and tribunals. It also 
provides principles that judicial officers should be guided by such as justice shall be done to 
all, irrespective of status; justice shall not be delayed; alternative forms of dispute resolution 
including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms 
shall be promoted, subject to clause (3) and justice shall be administered without undue 
regard to procedural technicalities.103Additionally, Article 160 of the COK of 2010 protects 
the judiciary by stating that it shall be subject only to this constitution and the law and not 
any other authority. It also states that the remuneration and benefits of judges shall come 
from a Consolidated Fund.104Another provision is Article 163 of the COK of 2010 which 
establishes the Supreme Court and provides for its exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and 
determine disputes regarding elections to the Office of the President and appellate 
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Court of Appeal regarding the application of the 
constitution and any matter of general public importance.105Another important provision is 
Article 173 which establishes the judiciary Fund which shall be administered by the Chief 
Registrar of the judiciary and shall be used for administrative expenses and shall be a charge 
on the Consolidated Fund and shall be paid directly into the judiciary Fund. 106Lastly, Section 
23 of the Sixth Schedule provides that Legislature shall enact legislation within one year 
establishing mechanisms and procedures for vetting the suitability of all judges and 
magistrates who were in office on the effective date.107 
All these provisions were implemented in the following years. I will now discuss in detail the 
vetting process as an example to the new constitutional reforms. 
The Vetting of Judges and magistrates Act was enacted in 2011. It establishes 
mechanisms and procedures for the vetting of judges and magistrates pursuant to the 
requirements of section 23 of the Sixth Schedule to the COK of 2010. This applied to judges 
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August 2010;  October 12, 2015, available at https://eisa.org.za/wep/ken2010referendum.htm  
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or magistrates who were in office before the effective date. It established the Judges and 
Magistrates Vetting Board which would carry out the vetting process. In determining the 
suitability of a judge or magistrate, it considers among others pending complaints from the 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and any recommendations for prosecution of the 
judge or magistrate by the Attorney-General or the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission.108  
The Board also considers elements of integrity such as a demonstrable consistent 
history of honesty and high moral character in professional and personal life, respect for 
professional duties, arising under the codes of professional and judicial conduct and the 
ability to understand the need to maintain propriety and the appearance of propriety.109 
3.1.1.1 Implementation 
Throughout the vetting exercise, a number of judges and magistrates were removed from 
office on allegations of corruption. However, the vetting exercise was greatly undermined by 
the case of Kenya Magistrates & Judges Association v JMVB [2014] eKLR. The Kenya 
Magistrates and Judges Association challenged the timeline of vetting in court stating that the 
mandate of the JMVB  is limited to determining   the  suitability  of  judges  and magistrates 
on the basis  of complaints arising or pending  before the promulgation of the Constitution 
and that any  complaints arising  after  the promulgation of the Constitution  are the exclusive 
province of the JSC established by Article 171 of the Constitution.110 The court held that the 
vetting of judges and magistrates would be confined between the date of appointment and the 
promulgation of the Constitution and any judicial officers vetted in respect to allegations 
were subjected to unlawful and unfair treatment contrary to Article 27 of the Constitution.111 
The proper interpretation should have been that judges and magistrates appointed after 2010 
were not subject to vetting and those appointed before were subject to vetting for all their 
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activities up to the day of vetting so to as to vet all judges and magistrates in office on the 
effective date.112 
 
3.2. The Judiciary Transformation Framework 
The JTF is an outline of the repositioning of the judiciary and the entire governance, 
justice, law and order sector to be more responsive to the needs of the people according to the 
Constitution.113 Its formulation was through a multi-stakeholder process involving judges, 
magistrates, judicial staff and other stakeholders in the justice sectors that was launched by 
the former Chief Justice Willy Mutunga. It highlighted the various areas which would be 
reformed from 2012 to 2016. 
 It is premised on four key pillars and ten overlapping key areas: People focused delivery of 
service; Transformative leadership, organisational culture and professional, motivated staff; 
Adequate financial resources and physical infrastructure and Harnessing Technology as an 
enabler of justice.114 
The ten key areas that would be tackled are: Access to and expeditious delivery of Justice; 
People-Centeredness and Public Engagement; Stakeholder Engagement; Philosophy and 
Culture; Leadership and Management; Organisational Structure; Growth of Jurisprudence 
and Judicial Practice; Physical Infrastructure; Resourcing and Value for Money and 
Harnessing Technology as an enabler for Justice.115 
3.2.1. Implementation 
The JTF brought about several reforms. There was the establishment of the Office of the 
Ombudsperson to receive and deal with public complaints. During its four years in operation, 
the Office of the judiciary Ombudsperson handled more than 21,000 complaints and 
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suggestions.116Another reform was the introduction of the online case allocation and 
management system. Moreover, there was the establishment of Court Users’ Committees, 
customer care desks and a service charter to distribute information about court processes and 
handle local-level problems. The customer care desks let litigants ask procedural questions 
and gave them help in navigating the system.117Additionally, 200 new judges and magistrates 
were hired and 25 new courts were established.118Other reforms included improved salaries 
and benefits for all judicial officers; establishment of an Inspectorate Unit by the JSC headed 
by professional investigators and set up an Internal Risk and Audit Directorate, which has 
audited 30 per cent of the court stations which has initiated some disciplinary processes and 
shuffling of judicial staff that have been in registries for 10 to 20 years which has dismantled 
corruption cartels.119 
However, the judiciary’s credibility has been reduced in the public eye due to several 
corruption scandals. For instance, in August 2013, the Chief Registrar was alleged to have 
made improper payments totaling an estimated KSh2.2 billion.120The Chief Registrar was 
further implicated in another case involving misappropriation of 310 million.121Additionally, 
in January 2016, a Supreme Court Judge Justice Tunoi is alleged to have received two 
million dollars (Sh200 million) in order to influence an election petition against Nairobi 
Governor Evans Kidero, filed by election challenger Ferdinand Waititu.122The Special 
Committee of the judiciary Service Commission found Justice Tunoi culpable in the Sh200 
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million bribery claims.123There has also been a notable lack of accessibility to case audit and 
service charter by judicial staff; limited access to information by the public; gaps in the 
implementation of financial policies and standards; lack of transparency in expenditure; and 
understaffing, case backlog and lack of ICT which lends to corruption.124 
3.3. Conclusion 
A study by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission on  Corruption and Ethics in 
the Judicial Sector in 2014 showed that judicial officers acknowledged the practice of 
payment of bribes to hide files(35%), abuse of office(24%), bribing the judges, prosecutors 
and clerks for favorable judgement(19%) as forms of corruption encountered in the sector.125 
On the other hand, 41% of the court users cited absenteeism as a form of corruption 
encountered followed by bribery in order to hide files (36%) and favoritism (34%).126 
The report stated that judicial officers stated that some reforms greatly reduced 
corruption such as open days, creation of court user’s committees, training, promulgation of 
the new Constitution, peer review committees, suspension of corrupt officials, the ICT 
system, the establishment of the office of the Ombudsperson, the new payment system of 
court fees, mobile courts and public vetting of top judicial officers.127 However, some 
reforms failed to reduce corruption such as improvement of remuneration of judicial officers, 
mass transfer of magistrates and staff and police reforms as corruption is deemed to be a 
personal choice and habit.128 The open office system encouraged familiarity and vetting of 
judicial officers was used to settle scores.129 
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This study shows that major strides in institutional reforms have been taken which 
have mitigated corruption to an extent by creating a transparent judicial process. Although 
they have not been entirely successful, the reforms are well-reasoned and only fail for a lack 
of proper implementation and enforcement. However, the reforms have failed to account for 
reforms incentivising individuals to not engage in corruption taking into account various 
political factors such as political aspirations, instability or democratic insecurity, socio-
cultural factors such as nepotism and tribalism and economic factors such as human greed.  
This study therefore looks to other countries in the next chapter to assist in creating a 
framework to mitigate institutional and personal incentives to engage in corruption bearing in 
mind all influencing factors. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARATIVE STUDY OF JUDICIAL ANTI-
CORRUPTION FRAMEWORKS 
1.1. Introduction 
 The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (WJPRLI) is a study which measures 
the performance of the rule of law in various countries. The measure of the rule of law is 
based on seven factors: informal justice, constraints in government powers, open 
government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, absence of 
corruption, civil justice system and the criminal justice system. 
 In 2016, Kenya was ranked at the bottom of the index scoring 0.43, with the highest 
score being 1.0. Kenya was placed 100th out of 113 countries. Additionally, the index 
categorised countries regionally and according to the income group.130 Below is a table 
detailing the findings of the WJPRLI study based on three main factors:  
                                                            



















0.26 0.34 16/18 26/28 108/113 
Table 1: WJPRLI indicators of the level of corruption in the Kenyan Judiciary131 
 This study, however, will not undertake an analysis based on similar categories used 
in the WJPRLI study, that is, the income rank, regional rank and global rank. This is due to 
the fact that a study based on the top global ranking country, Denmark, would result in 
unrealistic recommendations as they lack a historical background of a culture of corruption. 
Similarly, a study based on the top low middle income country, Morocco, would be 
unsuccessful due to lack of literature and lastly, a study based on the top regional ranking 
country, Botswana, would prove futile as it lacks a history of corruption and consequently, 
any incentives that would mitigate corruption. 
Instead, this study will discuss the following countries: Singapore, Hong Kong and China. 
This is due to the presence of the following factors: 
1. History of a culture of corruption 
2.  Creation of incentives for individuals/corporations to disengage in corrupt acts 
It is important to note that some of the reforms in the countries discussed may not influence 
or affect the judiciary in Kenya but may be useful if extrapolated. 
1.2. Singapore 
Since 1997, Singapore has been rated as one of the least corrupt countries in the world. 
Today, the courts practice a code of conduct which they call the “Ten Commandments”. 
These commandments are transparency in the selection and promotion of judges based on 
merit, competency in legal knowledge and experience; adequate remuneration to judges and 
court staff; an independent yet accountable judiciary; a coherent system of case management 
                                                            




which eliminates backlog and shortens waiting time; a Justices' Scorecard for the judiciary 
and the Judges which rigorously tracks performance measured through time-based, volume-
based and disposal-based indicators; a consistent and objective criteria in the administration 
of justice, including the establishment of a centralised sentencing court, standardised 
composition fees and fines and the application of tariffs in sentencing; clear ethical markers 
and guidelines for the Judges, comprising the Judges' Oath of Office, Judicial Ethics 
Reference Committee Report, Code of judiciary Ethics and the Government's Instruction 
Manual; a common vision for the judiciary and leadership by example by the Chief Justice 
provides unity of vision and purpose; all court proceedings are open, public hearings and the 
forging of strategic partnership with forward looking, progressive judiciaries and justice-
related institutions.132 
The legal framework for anti-corruption consists of the Penal Code and the Prevention of 
Corruption Act. The Prevention of Corruption Act provides for various provisions key to the 
fight against corruption such as the vesting of authority in the investigative agency to 
investigate corruption in both the public and private sectors and prosecution of both the bribe 
giver and the receiver; the presumption of corruption when a public officer is found to have 
received bribes; presumption of guilt of the bribe taker even if he or she, in fact, had no 
power, right or opportunity to return a favour to the bribe giver; forbidding the use of 
customary practices, for example, giving/accepting of ‘red packets’ in Chinese New Year as 
an excuse for giving/accepting bribes; empowerment of the Court to order bribe receivers to 
pay a penalty equal to the amount of bribe received apart from punishment in the form of 
fines and/or imprisonment terms; provision for the Principal to recover the amount of the 
bribe as a civil debt and the rendering of Singapore citizens liable for punishment for corrupt 
offences committed outside Singapore and to be dealt with as if the offences had been 
committed in Singapore.133  
1.3. China 
There are two major statutes in Chinese anti-bribery legislation: Criminal Law of the 
People’s Republic of China and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic 
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of China (AUCL).134 The AUCL covers bribery within the private sector but the Criminal 
Law covers bribery within the private sector, the electoral sector and the judicial sector.135  
In 1988, the Standard Committee of the National People’s Congress released an official 
document called Supplementary Provisions of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress concerning the Punishment of the Crimes of Embezzlement and 
Bribery.136 This document introduced the concepts of leniency and asymmetric punishment 
in the fight against corruption in China.  
The leniency provisions state that those who confess voluntarily before being investigated 
would be granted leniency. There would be an asymmetry in the eligibility to leniency in that 
bribe takers are only eligible if the size of the bribe is below a given threshold, while there is 
no limitation for the bribe giver.137 
Asymmetric punishment for harassment bribery was also introduced. The crime of giving a 
bribe is further described as anything associated with the intent to secure improper benefits 
where the briber seeks benefits that are in violation of law, regulations, rules, or state 
policies; or seeks benefits that are themselves legitimate, but are to be obtained by means of 
violating laws, regulations, rules, state policies, or industrial norms.138 This differentiation 
was useful in distinguishing harassment bribes from bribes that secure improper benefits. A 
harassment bribe involves something which the bribe giver had right to and the bribe giver 
would not be considered guilty.139  
1.4. Hong Kong 
The Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) was established in 1974 at the time 
when corruption was widespread, and Hong Kong, as a British Colony, was probably one of 
the most corrupt cities in the world.140 Within three years, the ICAC dismantled all 
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corruption syndicates in the Government and prosecuted 247 government officials, including 
143 police officers.141In thirty years, the ICAC eradicated all overt corruption in the 
government, enforced private sector corruption and changed the public attitude to toleration 
of corruption.142 
The ICAC uses the three pronged strategy: deterrence, prevention and education. The ICAC 
strategy as to deterrence involves various things such as a zero-tolerance policy which 
investigates all reports of corruption as long as there is reasonable suspicion; a review system 
to ensure all investigations are properly investigated; an effective public complaint system 
and 24 hour report centre; publicity of successful enforcement and a quick response system 
to deal with complaints.143 
The ICAC has a very wide range of education strategies as well such as a school ethics 
education programme from kindergarten up to the universities; media education; media 
publicity for example documentaries on successful cases; formation of an ICAC club for 
volunteers who would like to educate the community and corruption prevention talks and 
ethics development seminars.144 
Lastly, the ICAC employs an efficient preventions strategy involving enhancement of system 
control; enhancement of staff integrity; streamlining of procedures; ensuring proper 
supervisory checks and control; ensuring efficiency, transparency and accountability and 
promotion of a staff code of ethics.145 
 
1.5. Lessons from the Comparative Study 
These case studies illustrate that judicial corruption require both a good legal framework as 
well as proper enforcement by the relevant authority.   
Hong Kong’s experience shows that given political will at the top, a dedicated anti-
corruption agency and a correct strategy, even the most corrupt place like Hong Kong can be 
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transformed into a clean society.146 Although China has a relatively good legal anti-
corruption framework, the judiciary lacks independence and impartiality as it is prone to 
political influence. Lastly, Singapore shows that punitive measures and government support 
could effectively curb corruption. 
1.6. Conclusion 
These case studies show that corruption can indeed be mitigated through proper legal and 
administrative measures. However, it is necessary to establish a comprehensive strategy in 
tackling judicial corruption involving 4 steps:147 
1. Examine the external environmental i.e. the political environment, economic 
environment, social environment and legal environment. 
2. Examine the internal environment i.e. using the SWOT analysis to examine the 
system, staff, skill, structure, shared values and organisational style and strategy. 
3. Identify the major problems. 
4. Formulation of strategy and strategic plans. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the findings, recommendations and conclusions of the study. The main 
objective of this dissertation was to study corruption in the judiciary. 
5.2. Findings 
5.2.1. Existence of actual judicial corruption in Kenya 
Chapter one studies the existence and prevalence of corruption within the judiciary. The 
findings show that both petty and grand corruption exists within the judiciary. The judicial 
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reforms enacted over the years have not effectively mitigated corruption in the judiciary 
which has been on the rise in recent years involving high ranking officials of the judiciary. 
5.2.2. Causes of judicial corruption in Kenya  
Chapter 2 shows that before the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, the main causes of 
corruption within the judiciary were political interference, cultural and social tolerance, 
lack of a proper administrative and legal framework and lack of proper enforcement 
mechanisms. The COK 2010 brought with it new reforms as illustrated in Chapter 3 which 
overhauled the structure, legal and administrative framework of the judiciary. However, 
judicial corruption still exists to date due to cultural and social tolerance, individual 
behavior and lack of proper enforcement of reforms. 
5.2.3. Successes of judicial reforms over the years in mitigating corruption 
Before the promulgation of the COK 2010, the most successful judicial reforms in 
mitigating corruption involved the dismissal of judges, magistrates and judicial officers 
found guilty of corruption as envisaged in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 illustrates that after the 
promulgation of the COK 2010, more judicial reforms were implemented and succeeded 
such as vetting of judges and magistrates, creation of a judicial code of conduct, creation 
of the office of the ombudsperson, use of ICT in case management and payment of court 
fees, hiring of more judicial staff, increased salaries, public awareness and creation of 
court users committees and peer review committees which have greatly assisted in the 
prevention of corruption.  
5.2.4. Failures of judicial reforms over the years in mitigating corruption 
Prior to the COK of 2010, most, if not all of the judicial reforms failed due to a proper 
legal and administrative framework, lack of implementation, lack of government support 
and a proper enforcement mechanism. With the COK of 2010, several judicial reforms 
have been successfully implemented but many have failed due to lack of a proper 
enforcement mechanism to ensure deterrence of individual corrupt behavior, lack of 
government support and insufficient public awareness and education.  
5.3. Recommendations 





  Firstly, punitive measures should be enacted to deter individual behavior. In line with 
Singapore’s laws, both the bribe giver and the receiver should be charged with corruption 
charges. If convicted, the bribe receiver should pay a penalty of the amount of the bribe and 
receive punishment through imprisonment. Additionally, there should be a mandatory 
punitive penalty of imprisonment for the crime of corruption. For example, if any judicial 
staff is found guilty of engaging in corruption by the Judicial Service Commission, he or she 
will be liable for imprisonment for not less than five years.  
Additionally, leniency, whistleblowing and asymmetric punishment provisions should 
be enacted to deter social/ cartel behavior. In line with China’s laws, leniency and 
whistleblowing provisions should be enacted to break the informal bond and understanding 
between the bribe giver and bribe taker. Leniency ensures that the first involved party who 
confesses to the corrupt act is completely immune from prosecution while the other party will 
be held liable. Whistleblowing provisions protect the party who confesses from any danger. 
Asymmetric punishment provisions differentiate between (i) bribes which impose improper 
benefits from (ii) harassment bribes which the bribe giver is forced to give in order to gain 
access to a service or good which he has a right to and ensure the bribe giver is safe from 
prosecution due to harassment bribes.  
 
Another recommendation is that there should be public education and awareness to 
change cultural and social tolerance. A litigants’ charter should be readily available for 
anyone who would wish to institute a suit in court detailing the procedure and payment for 
transparency and accountability purposes. Additionally, the judiciary should include a 
judicial program within a general anti-corruption program to be taught from kindergarten to 
universities. The judiciary should initiate workshops, conferences and meetings for the 
development of better ideas on how to tackle corruption within the judiciary. Successful 
corruption cases should be highly publicised in the media. 
Lastly, the government should actively support the judiciary and promote its 




with the judiciary, non-interference with the budget of the judiciary and legalise the 
mandatory punishment of imprisonment for the crime of corruption. 
5.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study has achieved all the objectives it set out to do in Chapter 1. 
This study has identified the causes of judicial corruption over the years, analyzed the 
judicial reforms recommended and their implementation, identified loopholes in the anti-
corruption reforms recommended and/or implemented and made recommendations on how to 
improve the legal and administrative anti-corruption framework.  
This study has also confirmed its hypothesis that judicial corruption in Kenya can be 
mitigated through a myriad of political, social, economic, individual and cultural incentives. 
Through a historical analysis of judicial corruption in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, this study 
clearly illustrates that judicial corruption is caused by political, social, economic, individual 
and cultural factors. The study then recommends various reforms based on a political, socio-
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